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Abstract
This paper analyses the regulation of ambulatory care and its impact on physicianscareers,
using a representative panel of 6; 016 French self-employed GPs over the years 1983 to 2004. The
beginning of their activity is inuenced by the regulated number of places in medical schools,
named in France numerus clausus. We show that the policies aimed at manipulating the numerus
clausus strongly a¤ect physicianspermanent level of earnings.
Our empirical approach allows us to identify experience, time and cohort e¤ects in GPsearn-
ings. The estimated cohort e¤ect is very large, revealing that intergenerational inequalities due
to uctuations in the numerus clausus are not negligible. GPs beginning during the eighties have
the lowest permanent earnings: they faced the consequences of an unlimited number of places in
medical schools in the context of a high density due to the baby-boom numerous cohorts. Con-
versely, the decrease in the numerus clausus led to an increase in permanent earnings of GPs
who began their practice in the mid nineties. Overall, the estimated gap in earnings between
"good" and "bad" cohorts may reach 25%. We performed a more thorough analysis of the earn-
ings distribution to examine whether individual unobserved heterogeneity could compensate for
average di¤erences between cohorts. Our results about stochastic dominance between earnings
distributions by cohort show that it is not the case.
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1 Introduction
Physician incomes throughout developped countries are among the highest for any occupational group
(McGuire, 2000). However, the literature devoted to physician behaviour traditionally focuses on
physicianspayment schemes and the incentives they create for the quantity and quality of care pro-
vided. We want to adress another worthwhile issue: the level of physician incomes. Indeed, doctors
earnings inuences both the attractiveness of the profession and, whether they are paid according
to a fee-for-service scheme, the incentive for doctors to induce demand. Moreover, the contentious
target-income hypothesis refers to an assessment, from the physician, about the fairness of his or her
earnings. The aim of this paper is to study di¤erences in incomes between generations of doctors.
In France, general practitioners (GP) are paid under a fee-for-service scheme; their earnings are
therefore closely related to the amount of services they provide. In such a system, the number of
physicians is a key determinant of the level of their earnings. Our article examines the link between
the regulation of the number of physicians in France and physiciansearnings and careers.
This issue is addressed using longitudinal individual data about French GPs. We estimate GPs
earnings functions to identify experience, cohort and time e¤ects in physiciansearnings. Time e¤ects
correspond to events that a¤ect all physicians identically in one year. Experience e¤ects refer to the
evolution of activity since the beginning of the practice, and cohort e¤ects relate to earnings di¤erences
between cohorts of physicians. Then, we perform stochastic dominance tests between distributions of
earnings to allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity.
This article is of major interest for three reasons. Firstly, we provide empirical evidence that the
regulation of the number of physicians has a lasting impact on physicians careers. More precisely,
we show that physicians "permanent" earnings are strongly inuenced by changes in the numerus
clausus, i.e. the number of places in medical schools. Secondly, we use an original and reliable
source of information on self-employed GPs. Our dataset is a representative panel of 6; 016 French
self-employed GPs observed over the 1983  2004 period, which corresponds to 81; 691 individual-year
observations. This sample is drawn from an exhaustive source of information : the administrative les
about self-employed physicians collected by the public health insurance. Reliable data about self-
employed workers are not numerous. But the French organization of ambulatory care (GPs are paid
by patients who are reimbursed by the public health insurance) leads to administrative data which
do not su¤er from a lack of reliability. Thirdly, we provide results on the carreers of self-employed
professionals, which shed light on results relative to salaried workers obtained in the eld of labour
economics.
Literature about physiciansearnings is not plentiful. As stated above, most studies focus on the
impact of payment schemes on care provision (McGuire, 2000). Studies about self-employed profession-
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als are very scarce. A pioneering work was performed by Friedman and Kuznets in 1945 to compare
physicians to other professionals (lawyers, dentists). Then the issue of careers of self-employed profes-
sionals was adressed on cross-sectional data by Lazear and Moore (1984). More recently, Parker (2005)
performed on longitudinal data a comparison between earnings of British self-employed professionals
and employees. To our knowledge, no paper has so far addressed the issue of physicianscareers on
longitudinal data.
This paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the data. Then we briey
show how ambulatory care is regulated in France and perform a descriptive analysis of GPscareers.
The next section is devoted to the identication of time, experience and cohort e¤ects in physicians
earnings. Then, we perform a more thorough analysis of the earnings distributions, using stochastic
dominance tests. The nal section concludes.
2 Data
Our dataset is an extraordinary source of information on physicianscareers in France: it is a 10%
random sample of all self-employed GPs practicing between 1983 and 2004. It is drawn from an
administrative le about French self-employed GPs collected by the public health insurance (Caisse
Nationale dAssurance Maladie des Travailleurs Salariés, CNAMTS). Given that the public health
insurance is mandatory and universal in France, this sample is drawn from the exhaustive source of
information about self-employed physicians. The latter account for 84% of physicians operating in
ambulatory care; the others are salaried doctors who work in schools or rms.
The panel is unbalanced: each physician i is observed for a period Ti, which can begin after 1983
(beginner physician) or end before 2004 (retiring physician). For each physician i at year t, we have
information about age, gender, year of PhD, year of the beginning of practice, level and composition of
activity (o¢ ce visits, home visits, surgery or radiology acts), location (with two administrative levels:
département, with 95 digits and région, with 22 digits), practice earnings. We also know whether the
GP has a MEP specialization, i.e. a specic activity such as acupuncture or homeopathy, or not.
In France, self-employed physicians are paid according to a fee-for-service scheme. More than 80%
of physicians belong to sector 1, where fees are xed by an administrative process. Free setting of
fees is only authorised for a minority of physicians, those enrolled in sector 2. As the choice between
sector 1 and 2 has only been possible between 1982 and 1992, most physicians are paid under a fee-
for-service sheme with xed fees. Their income relies only on their level of activity. In order to keep
an homogeneous sample to study the relationship between activity and earnings, we focused on sector
1 doctors. We also selected GPs who began their practice between 1970 and 2001: On the whole, the
nal sample consists of 6; 016 GPs with a total of 81; 691 individual-year observations over years 1983
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to 2004.
The representativeness of our sample is slightly a¤ected by the fact that some physicians leave the
sample. These exits can be transitory or not. About 16 % observations are concerned. It was possible
in some cases to nd the exit reasons: a moving to another département, or a switch to sector 2. In
our empirical approach, we shall deal with a potential selection bias.
Table 1 summarizes the structure of the sample. It gives an idea of the richness of the available
information: 32 cohorts (dened by the rst year in self-employed practice) and 95 to 290 physicians
per cohort are observed over years 1983 to 2004. Experience ranges from 1 to 34 years. This database
will allow a very exible specication using dummy variables to identify experience, time and cohort
e¤ects in GPsearnings. Information about cohorts relative to years 1945 to 1969 and 2002  2003 is
also available. However, for these cohorts, the number of observed GPs was unstable and too small
(between 12 and 85) for a relevant econometric analysis: these observations were eliminated.
Basic features of the data are displayed in table 2. The proportion of female physicians increases
rapidly over the period, from 13% in 1983 to about 25% in 2004. The average experience level triples
between 1983 (5:8 years) and 2004 (17:6 years). This reects the ageing of the physician population,
due to the combined e¤ects of the baby-boom and of the restrictive policies, implemented from the mid
70s to reduce the number of physicians. The change in the average experience derives also partly from
the sample selection process, given that cohorts 1945 to 1969 were eliminated. Computing the same
statistics for the whole sample, one nds a still sizeable but less spectacular increase in the average
experience, from 11 years in 1983 to 18 years in 2004.
Earnings are dened by the total fees received by the GP during the year. Matching our database
with scal records, we were able to compute earnings net of charges at the individual level for years
1993   2004. In 2004, the average earnings net of charges equal e 62; 024. Using the OECD Health
Database (2006) and measuring the earnings in US $ PPP, international comparisons of GPsearnings
levels can be performed. These data show that the earnings of American self-employed GPs are 91%
higher than the earnings of their French counterparts. As for Swiss, Canadian and British GPs, their
earnings are, respectively, 29%, 26% and 12% higher. To sum up, the earnings of French GPs appear
to be rather moderate.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 1: Cohorts included in the working sample
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2: Basic features of the data
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3 The French regulation of the ambulatory care
3.1 Insurance coverage
In France, about 99% of the population is covered by the mandatory public health insurance, which
covers about 70% of individual health care expenses. Each treatment has a reference price xed by
agreement between physicians and the health insurance administration. In addition to the public
system, individuals can subscribe to a voluntary private insurance scheme or be covered through
occupational group private insurance. These complementary insurance contracts cover the share of
expenses (30 %) not covered by the public health insurance. In 2000, a reform (CMU, i.e. Couverture
Maladie Universelle) was implemented to provide a free complementary coverage to low-income people.
Thanks to these di¤erent kinds of insurance schemes, 80% of the population get 100% of the reference
price reimbursed over the period 1983-2004, and the coverage is even higher from 2000 on. Moreover,
patients freely choose the type of practioners they consult and can visit several GPs for the same
illness. A gatekeeping system has been introduced at the end of year 2004. Given the period covered
by our data (1983  2004), the activity of the observed GPs are not a¤ected by this reform.
3.2 The number of practicing physicians
The supply of physicians is mainly dened by the number of students who obtained their diploma
in medicine in France. Foreign doctors came only recently. Education to become a GP is provided
by faculties of medicine. The medical studies consist of 6 years, common to all medical specialties
and 1 more year (until 1988) or 2 or even 3 more years (after 2001) as a junior practitioner. This
education ends with a PhD. A common exam has been introduced in 2004 to manage the students
choice between various specialties, General Practice being one of them. This introduced a great change
in the choice for General Practice: depending on their ranking, students were given the possibility to
choose another specialty.
Places in medical schools have been regulated since 1971 via the numerus clausus. This is a strong
selection at the end of the rst year in medical school : only 10% could go on with their medical
education after the rst year1 . In France medical education is almost free. On the one hand, this
contrasts strongly with the American situation, where tuition is rather expensive and amounts to a
sizeable investment for the student. On the other hand, selection is less severe in the United States:
there are about two applicants for a spot in medical school (McGuire, 2000).
In France, the regulation of ambulatory care does not experience serious di¢ culties but recurrent
problems. Among OECD countries, France has one of the highest physician:population ratio (Bourgueil
1A recent increase in the numerus clausus raised this share to 17% .
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et al,.2006). At the geographical level, despite the high level of medical density, the location of doctors
in very uneven. This induces inequality in the access to care (distance to the doctor). Moreover, one
consequence of the 2004 medical education reform has been the decrease in the number of students
choosing to specialize in General Practice (Billaut, 2006). Furthermore, less students are willing to
practice as self-employed doctors. They more often choose a salaried practice at the end of their studies
(Bourgueil, 2007). Finally, there is an empirical evidence of supply-induced demand as concerns French
GPs. This behaviour is more prominent in départements where the level of medical density is high,
corresponding to more than 110 GPs per 100; 000 inhabitants (Delattre and Dormont, 2003).
A relevant regulation of the supply of GPs should follow three main objectives: ensure an equal
access to care; restore the attractiveness of the self-employed GP profession and avoid supply-induced
demand behaviour. This involves a su¢ cient number of GPs, a more even location and fair earnings.
3.3 The cohort pyramid
Graphs (1) and (2) display "cohort pyramids" drawn from our dataset, each cohort being dened
by the rst year in self-employed practice. These pyramids have a really chaotic shape, interpretable
using information on events that happened years before: i) demographic changes, using the number
of births 30 years earlier (as GPs begin their practice at the average age of 30); ii) changes in the
numerus clausus 9 or 10 years earlier (the average length of medical education).
The small number of physicians belonging to the pre-1970 cohorts is due to retirements : 95% to
100% of those physicians retired during the 1983   2004 period. The huge increase in the number of
physicians belonging to the 1974 to 1978 cohorts (graph (1)) is explained both by the baby-boom and
no regulation of the number of places in medical schools. The impact of the numerus clausus appears
clearly on graph (2). Before its implementation, the growth in the number of practicing physicians
followed the French population growth. This reform introduced a discrepancy between changes in the
number of GPs and the general demographic growth, as shown on the right side of graph (1).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1: Cohort pyramid (by year of setting) and number of births 30 years before
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2: Phyisicians per cohort and numerus clausus 9 and 10 years before the rst year in activity
3.4 A descriptive analysis of French GPscareers
Graph (3) gives the average GPsearnings (in 2004 euros) by cohort and experience. We observe a
reversed "U-shaped" prole, which could characterize experience e¤ects. However this graph is built
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using raw earnings: cohort, time and experience e¤ects are mixed up. A more relevant approach is to
draw average earnings net of time e¤ects, by cohort and experience. Let wict denote the earnings in
year t of the ith physician belonging to the cth cohort. Graph (4) shows the values of w:ct w::t where
w:ct stands for the average earnings of cohort c in t and w::t is the average earnings in year t. For a
better readability, only 7 cohorts are displayed. These cohorts are also labelled on graph (1) to locate
them clearly on the cohort pyramid: we will concentrate on these cohorts throughout the analysis. On
graph (4), the 1972 cohort has the highest earnings. Then earnings decrease for the 1977 cohort and
even more for the 1985 and 1993 cohorts. These results reveal inequalities between cohorts.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3: Mean earnings by cohort and experience
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4: Mean earnings, net of time e¤ects, by cohort and experience
4 Estimating the earnings function
The estimation performed in this section allows us to disentangle experience, time and cohort e¤ects
in physiciansearnings and examine their relative impact.
4.1 The econometric specication
We consider the earnings function rst introduced by Mincer (1974) to measure returns on human
capital and experience. In this approach, the log of individual earnings is traditionally explained by
education and a polynomial function of experience. The meaning of this specication is slightly di¤erent
when studying GPsearnings. Indeed, all GPs have the same education level. Moreover, the e¤ect of
experience on earnings results more likely from the doctors patient number than from an increase in
her productivity due to human capital accumulation.
Let yict denote the log of earnings (in 2004 euros) in year t of the ith physician belonging to the
cth cohort. One has :
yict = a+Dictb+ Z
0
icd+ e + t + c + "ict; (1)
i = 1; :::N; c = 1::::C; t = 1::::T and e = 1::::E
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where Dict includes two indicators of the medical density (the number of GPs and the number of
specialists per 100; 000 inhabitants in the département where physician i works) which vary during
the period of observation. Z
0
ic includes time-invariant variables such as gender (= 1 for a female),
the number of years between PhD and the beginning of practice, region of practice, type of practice
(full-time independant GP or not), MEP physician or not, location of practice (city center, suburban
area, urban sprawl or rural area).
Our data set allows us to consider a more exible specication of the impact of experience than the
traditional polynomial function. We specify experience xed e¤ects, denoted e (e = 1; :::; 34) and
estimated by introducing dummy variables. Experience is dened as the number of years since the
rst year of practice. Similarly, t (t = 1983; :::; 2004) and c (c = 1970; :::; 2001) are time and cohort
e¤ects. Cohort is dened as the rst year in self-employed practice.
The extensive use of various xed e¤ects raises identication problems. Our specication is not
identiable without the addition of restrictions on the xed e¤ects. We used the following constraints:
X
e
e = 0;
X
t
t = 0 and
X
c
c = 0 (2)
X
c
c  c = 0 (3)
Constraints (2) come down to dene a reference category for each of the three e¤ects. The reference
category is 7 years for experience and 1983 for time. For cohort e¤ects, we imposed that all e¤ects sum
to zero.
Constraint (3) is specied to deal with another colinearity source : for each physician i, one has
t = c + e: For instance, in year 1990, GPs belonging to cohort 1970 have, by denition, 20 years of
experience2 . Imposing no trend on cohort e¤ects (constraint (3)) is a way to solve this colinearity
problem. We could have imposed the same kind of constraint on time rather than on cohort e¤ects
(Deaton, 1997). The information displayed on graph (1) suggests there is no trend on cohort e¤ects,
but no theoretical background is available to choose the e¤ect on which to put the additional constraint.
Our challenge was then to nd empirical evidence of a lack of trend for the cohort e¤ects. We estimated
(1) using xed e¤ects relative to group-of-cohorts (5 groups) instead of cohort xed e¤ects. This
approach is another strategy to eliminate the colinearity source. Indeed, one has t 6= (groups of c)+e.
The results are detailed in appendix A: they show that the estimates of the group-of-cohort e¤ects
2This is not true for all Gps of the sample, given that some of them experience a break in their carreer. In this case,
we correct the experience e by substracting the duration of the break. Only 6 % of the observations are concerned: t is
strongly correlated with c+ e:
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have no trend, justifying constraint (3).
The Heckman sample selection model is not appropriate to deal with our potential selectivity biases.
Indeed, we have seen that there are various reasons for a GP to leave the sample. These reasons cannot
be accurately specied by a single participation equation. Following Verbeek and Nijman (1992), we
simply added ve dummy variables indicating whether the GP has quit the sample, or not, denitely or
not, for a sector change, a moving or other reasons. The coe¢ cients of these dummies were signicant,
revealing a selection bias. We can present the results of the estimates with or without the dummies.
This comes down to include or eliminate the outgoing GPs for the estimation. Actually, the estimated
proles of the cohort, experience and time e¤ects we are interested in, do not di¤er with or without
these dummies. We thus present the results obtained without the dummies, thus considering all GPs3 .
Our model does not control for unobserved heterogeneity among physicians. Considering an error-
component model would make it di¢ cult to identify the cohort e¤ects we are interested in. Another
failings of our empirical approach is that it cannot allow for the potential non-exogeneity of explanatory
variables such as type and location of practice. Indeed, no appropriate instrument is available to explain
the doctorslocation choices. In addition, we should have a specic sample of beginners to provide a
relevant explanation of location choice.
4.2 Results
The estimated experience, time and cohort e¤ects are reported on graphs (5) to (7). The estimates
of the other parameters are presented in table 5 (Appendix B).
On average, female physiciansearnings are 34% lower than males. Fees being xed, this gap is
mainly related to di¤erences in the number of hours worked. But the reason why women work less
remains unexplained. Unfortunately, we do not have any information on household composition at our
disposal. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2006) consider three possible explanations : di¤erences in productivity,
di¤erences in preferences relative to the duration of work or gender discrimination from patients and
other practitioners. Rizzo and Zeckhauser show that di¤erences in preferences account for the entire
di¤erentials in income: males"reference income" is higher than femalesand males are more likely to
spend less time per patient or to focus on more lucrative procedures.
The GPsand specialistsdensity indicators can be seen as proxies of the competition intensity
and supply shocks faced by the physician in his practice area. On the one hand, our estimates show
that the specialists:population ratio is not signicant, revealing that GPsactivity does not compete
with specialistsactivity (pediatricians for example). On the other hand, there is competition between
GPs : a rise in the level of the GPs:population ratio (for example from 100 to 110 GPs per 100; 000
3The other estimates are available on request.
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inhabitants) leads to a 2; 4 percentage points drop in the level of earnings. This impact is sizeable as
it comes in addition to the regional xed e¤ects (see estimates in appendix B) which include a part of
the medical density e¤ect. The average earnings of physicians living in the south of France, where the
level of medical density is very high, are around 8% less than the earnings of those living in the Paris
area (the reference). On the contrary, the center and north of France are rather deserted by physicians
and we nd physicians practicing in those régions earn up to 20% more than physicians practicing
around Paris. Recently, policies have been implemented to provide nancial incentives for physicians
to locate in these regions. Our results show that living in those areas already means higher earnings
(i.e. more work).
We now come to the estimates of time, experience and cohort xed e¤ects.
Experience e¤ects
Earnings are a reversed u-shaped function of experience (graph (5)). This pattern is rather di¤erent
from the increasing and concave function of experience usually observed for salaried workers. Major
di¤erences can be pointed out for GPs. Firstly, there is a huge increase at the beginning of the practice.
Between the rst and the seventh year (reference year), the earnings growth is 37%: This can be
considered as the time needed by a GP to build up its practice. Secondly, unlike salaried workers
whose earnings remain stable during numerous years, there is no period of stabilisation. For GPs the
maximum earnings is reached after 12 years and then decreases rapidly. For comparison with the
average earnings after 7 years, GPs earnings are 12% lower after 25 years of practice and 24% lower
after 30 years.
There are currently numerous debates among labour economists on the inuence of age and experience
on the individual productivity. Our results on self-employed doctors shed light on the behaviour of
people whose number of hours worked is mostly inuenced by individual preferences, contrary to
salaried workers whose labour duration is constrained by the demand they face. Our results show that
GPs take advantage of the freedom o¤ered by an independant practice to reduce their level of activity
much sooner. They concentrate their activity in the rst 15 years of practice.
This result di¤ers strongly from the ndings of Lazear and Moore (1984) who report a atter earnings-
prole for self-employed workers than for salary workers. Refering to Lazears theory of an earnings
prole implemented by the rm to provide work incentives, they argue that such incentives are not at
stake for self-employed workers. However, Lazear and Moore results derive from estimates performed
on cross-sectional data with a very parametric specication. It is well-known that longitudinal data as
ours are more appropriate to provide relevant estimates of experience e¤ects. Our results show that
GPs career is inuenced by the need to reimburse large investments made at the beginning of the
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practice. The decrease in activity observed after 12 years reveals however some preferences for leisure,
once reimbursements have been done.
Time e¤ects
The estimates show that there was a large and constant growth in real earnings between 1983
and 2004, with an annual growth rate of 0; 9% (graph (6)). Time e¤ects on earnings derive from the
estimation of 1 subject to 2 and 3. Time e¤ects on activity derive from the same estimation performed
on a model whose dependent variable is activity, i:e: the average annual number of encounters between
the physician and his patients. Encounters are of di¤erent types: o¢ ce visits, home visits, surgery
or radiology acts. As fees are xed, the gap between the two curves is only due to the rise in fees
granted by the government after bargainings with physiciansunions and the public health insurance.
The major increases were in 1988, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2003: As a consequence, even though activity
remained constant or increased sligthly during these years, earnings did progress a lot. On the contrary,
the growth of activity did not lead to much increase in earnings during years without any revalorisation.
Cohort e¤ects
The estimated cohort e¤ects are very large : the gap in earnings between cohorts may reach 25%
(graph (7)). The cohort e¤ect is rather high for cohorts prior to 1978, then deeply decreases for cohorts
relative to the eigthies and the beginning of the nineties. It gets better for cohorts of the mid-nineties.
Cohorts of GPs beginning during the eighties have the lowest permanent earnings. For example, GPs
who began their practice in 1985 earn 19:6% less than cohort 1972. Graph (1) shows that they had to
deal with the impact of baby-boom numerous cohorts. Furthermore, graph (2) shows that the number
of places in medical schools was still high. Given the large number of praticians beginning their activity
at the same time, those cohorts were confronted with a high degree of competition.
The decrease in the numerus clausus led to an increase in the permanent earnings of GPs who began
their practice in the mid nineties. For instance, cohorts who began in 1999 earn 16.8% more than
cohort 1985 (but still less than cohort 1972). A measure authorizing praticians to retire at the age
of 60, without any loss of earnings, also helped to reduce the number of physicians and favored the
beginning of new cohortspractice.
Other professions are a¤ected by the Baby Boom. The impact of cohort size on earnings has already
been documented for salaried workerscareers. For example, Welch (1979) nds a drop in earnings of
new entrants in labour markets, coinciding with the arrival of the peak-size cohorts spawned by the
baby boom.
As stated above, we have computed earnings net of charges at the individual level for years 1993 to
2004. We do not present the estimates of experience, time and cohort e¤ects on net earnings. Indeed,
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they are very similar to the results presented here.
Our results show that the demographic situation that prevails at the beginning of the practice
strongly a¤ects GPspermanent level of earnings. However, the unobserved heterogeneity a¤ecting
GPsearnings is quite large: the earnings variability explained by our model is only 27% (R2). Hence,
doctors belonging to a bad cohort could compensate for their disadvantage with individual dynamism,
motivation and greater taste for their work. All these earnings determinants are components of the
unobserved individual heterogeneity. So far, our approach has been a rst-order analysis. In the
following, we use a stochastic dominance approach to take the whole distribution of earnings into
account. The unobserved heterogeneity is no more considered as a residual but included in the analysis.
We examine if our results are maintained or if individual unobserved heterogeneity can compensate
for average di¤erences between cohorts.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Figure 5: Experience specic e¤ects on earnings
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Figure 6: Time specic e¤ects on earnings and activity
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
Figure 7: Cohort specic e¤ects on earnings
5 Stochastic dominance and inequalities between cohorts
5.1 Denitions
Let FC and FC0 be the distributions of earnings of two di¤erent cohorts. Their cumulative distribution
functions (CDF) are FC(x) and FC0 (x), where x  0 is the level of earnings.
Denition 1 FC SD1 FC0 , 8x 2 R+; FC(x)  FC0 (x), with one strict inequality.
If FC0 lies nowhere below FC and at least somewhere above FC , then FC displays rst-order
stochastic dominance over distribution FC0 : Graphically, it means that FC is everywhere to the right
of FC0 . In terms of welfare economics, it means that for any x  0, the distribution FC is ranked
better than FC0 for any welfare function that is both increasing in x and anonymous.
If the two distributions cross, rst-order dominance does not hold anymore. One must rank the
distributions using second-order stochastic dominance criterion.
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Denition 2 FC SD2 FC0 , 8x 2 R+;
xZ
0
FC(t)dt 
xZ
0
FC0 (t)dt
If the area under FC up to x is less than the area under FC0 up to x, then distribution FC is said
to (strictly) second-order dominate distribution FC0 . It means that, for any x  0, FC is a better
distribution than FC0 for any welfare function with an increasing and concave utility.
Remark 1 FC SD1 FC0 ) FC SD2 FC0 :More generally, stochastic dominance of order s implies
stochastic dominance of order s+ 1
Remark 2 From Shorrocks (1983), scaling up the Lorenz curves to form the generalized Lorenz
curve will often reveal a dominance relationship. He suggests to prefer a distribution FC over a distri-
bution FC0 if its generalized Lorenz curve is nowhere below the generalized Lorenz curve of FC0 . For
Thistle (1989), generalized Lorenz dominance is equivalent to second-order stochastic dominance.
Comparing the cumulative distribution functions of di¤erent cohorts gives an idea of the relations
of dominance between the cohorts. But statistical tests need to be implemented to give more robust
results.
5.2 Testing for stochastic dominance on raw earnings
We follow the methodology used by Pistolesi (2006) and based on Davidson and Duclos work to
implement non parametric stochastic dominance tests (2000). Dominance ordering is performed by
comparing vectors of poverty indices between two cohorts. Dominance of order s of the cohort C over
the cohort C 0 implies that, regardless of the poverty line chosen, the poverty measure DsZ is lower for
distribution C than for distribution C 0. Wald tests, where a set of inequality constraints is tested,
are used to rank all pairs of cohorts C and C 0. These tests are more extensively explained in Lefranc,
Pistolesi and Trannoy (2004).
Our purpose is to test whether there is dominance of a cohort over another one or not. Three kinds
of tests are considered:
1. We test the null hypothesis of rst-order stochastic dominance of cohort C over cohort C 0 and
of cohort C 0 over cohort C. If this test does not give any clear conclusion (i:e: if C dominates
C 0 and C 0 dominates C) we perform test 2. Otherwise, as it means that one cohort dominates
another one at di¤erent points of the earnings distribution, we may conclude that there are
intergenerational inequalities between cohorts C and C 0:
2. We test the null hypothesis of second-order stochastic dominance of cohort C over cohort C 0 and
of cohort C 0 over cohort C. Again, without any strong conclusion, we perform test 3. Otherwise,
we may conclude again that there are intergenerational inequalities between cohorts C and C 0:
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3. We test the null hypothesis of equality of cohorts C and C 0 earnings distributions. If the null
hypothesis is accepted, we may conclude that there are no intergenerational inequalities.
The results are presented in table 34 . The 1970s cohorts have the highest permanent earnings and
dominate all cohorts. Cohorts of the eighties and beginning of the nineties have the lowest earnings.
They are rst-order stochastically dominated by nearly all other cohorts. New cohorts (1999) have
higher earnings than the 1985 and 1993 cohorts but are still dominated by the 1970s cohorts5 .
Such results would mean that unobserved heterogeneity cannot compensate for average di¤erences
between cohorts. Nevertheless, this ranking is performed using raw earnings. Cohorts are compared
for di¤erent levels of experience and di¤erent years. The previous section has shown that these vari-
ables account for a great part of earnings di¤erences between physicians. We improve the analysis by
combining stochastic dominance tests with microsimulations.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3: Stochastic dominance tests for selected cohorts - raw earnings
5.3 Testing for stochastic dominance on simulated earnings
We construct an hypothetical earnings distribution for each cohort. We simulate earnings that physi-
cians would have if they had the same characteristics, except their cohort and unobserved heterogene-
ity6 .
Letgyict denote the simulated earnings of physician i, at year t, belonging to the cth cohort. One has :
gyict = Dbb+ Z bd+d10 +[1995 + bc +d"ict (4)
where D stands for the average GPs:population ratio and the average specialits:population ratio calcu-
lated over the 1983 2004 period, Z stands for male physicians, practicing in Paris as full-independent
workers with no MEP specialization and a two-year period before beginning their practice. They
are observed in 1995 and all have 10 years of experience7 . bb, bd, d10, [1995 and bc are the estimated
coe¢ cients from equation (1) andd"ict are the estimated residuals.
The results are displayed on graph (8) and table 4. Compared to the previous analysis, there are three
major di¤erences. Firstly, nearly all cohorts can be ranked using the rst-order stochastic dominance
4We concentrate on the 5 cohorts displayed on graph (1) for consistency with the results of the previous section.
The analysis was also performed using all cohorts, but we nd that the earning distributions of these 5 cohorts are
representative of the distributions observed for all cohorts belonging to the same decade.
5The test is performed with a 5% signicance level. Statistic values and condence intervals for rst and second order
stochastic dominance are not reported on this graph for a better readability. They are available on request.
6Such a micro-simulation analysis has been developed by Bourguignon and ali. (2002) and used by Dormont and
Milcent (2006)
7Our results do not depend on the year of reference or on the level of experience chosen.
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criterion. Indeed, di¤erences between cohorts are more pronounced. Again, unobserved heterogeneity
does not compensate for average di¤erences between cohorts. Secondly, earnings distributions of cohorts
1972 and 1999 are now equal : with identical characteristics, young cohorts have the same level
of earnings as the better-o¤ old cohorts. Thirdly, the 1985 cohort is now rst-order stochastically
dominated by all cohorts, and more particularly by the 1993 one. On raw earnings, the experience
level of doctors belonging to these cohorts was partly compensating the bad 1985 cohort e¤ect.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
Figure 8: Simulated earnings distributions by cohorts
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Table 4: Stochastic dominance tests for selected cohorts - simulated earnings
6 Conclusion
Our results show that GPs earnings are a¤ected by very large cohort e¤ects. Intergenerational
inequalities due to uctuations in the numerus clausus are far from negligible. The demographic
situation that prevails at the beginning of the practice a¤ects GPspermanent level of earnings. Our
stochastic dominance approach shows that earnings di¤erences between cohorts do not disappear when
we take the whole distribution of earnings into account. The unobserved individual heterogeneity does
not compensate for average di¤erences between cohorts. Given these results, one can wonder whether
the rise in the numerus clausus decided in France from 2002 on is really appropriate. As a rise in
the numerus clausus has a negative impact on physicians earnings, such a policy may reduce the
attractiveness of the profession.
Our study on longitudinal data also provides original results on the careers of self-employed profes-
sionals. Our estimates are not a¤ected by confusion between cohort and experience e¤ects that arise
when cross sectional data are used. In addition, we specify a very exible form for experience e¤ects
and nd that the curvature of the reversed u-shaped experience prole is much more pronounced for
GPs than what is usually estimated for salaried workers. They concentrate their activity in the rst
15 years and then reduce it strongly. Such a result deserves further investigations in order to assess if
this result can be the revelation of a pronounced preference for leisure, which would not be observable
for salaried workers whose labour duration is more constrained.
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8 Appendix A: The choice of identifying constraints
As stated in the section devoted to the econometric specication, the identication of model (1) involves
the addition of a linear constraint to constraints (2). Otherwise, one has t = c+ e for each physician i.
We have to choose between two contraints: no trend on cohort e¤ects (
P
c
c  c = 0 (3)) or no trend
on time e¤ects: X
t
t  t = 0 (5)
No theoretical background is available to choose the e¤ect on which to put the additional constraint.
We provide in this appendix our rationale for choosing constraint (3). To nd empirical evidence of a
lack of trend for the cohort e¤ects, we use an alternative strategy to eliminate the colinearity source.
Considering an aggregation of cohorts, we can directly estimate group-of-cohort xed e¤ects: indeed,
t 6= (groups of c) + e.
Graph 9 displays the experience e¤ects estimated by applying three alternative identifying strate-
gies: constraint "no trend on cohort e¤ects" (3), constraint "no trend on time e¤ects"(5) and the
"group-of-cohort" specication. We rst notice that the choice between contraint (3) and (5) has a
very strong impact on the estimates. The mechanical e¤ect of the contraints can easily be understood:
if we impose no trend on time e¤ects, the general agreements that progressively raised medical fees
over time are captured by the experience e¤ect. The resulting curve (denoted "constraint on time") is
increasing with experience because the share of doctors with a high experience level is increasing over
time in the medical population as well as in our sample (more precisely, doctors with an experience
greater than 20 years represent 7.5 % of the sample in 1993; they are 25 % in 1998 and 41 % in 2004).
Why should we consider constraint (3) instead of (5) ? The curves in graph 10 represent the cohort
e¤ects estimated with constraint (3) and with the specication in terms of group-of-cohort. The
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estimates obtained on the latter give a strong empirical support to the idea that there is no trend on
the cohort e¤ects. Moreover, the pattern of the two curves are very similar.
Turning back to the estimated experience e¤ects in graph 9, we notice that the e¤ects estimated
with constraint (3) are not signicantly di¤erent from the ones estimated with the group-of-cohort
specication (95% condence intervals are displayed in the graph).
On the whole, this empirical analysis leads to the conclusion that there is no trend on the cohort
e¤ects. This result is consistent with our historical knowledge of the considered period: (i) fees have
been steadily raised by general agreements between 1983 and 2004, which disqualify the idea of no
trend on the time e¤ect; (ii) the baby-boom and the introduction of the numerus clausus led to large
uctuations in the medical demography, which is consistent with no trend on the cohort e¤ect.
[Insert Figure 9 about here]
Figure 9: Experience xed e¤ects estimated with three alternative specications
[Insert Figure 10 about here]
Figure 10: Cohort xed e¤ects estimated with two alternative specications
9 Appendix B : Estimates of the earnings function
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Table 5: Estimates of the earnings function
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Cohort (First year in
activity)
Sample size Number of
observed
physicians
Years observed Range of
experience (1)
1970 1,290 97 1983-2004 13-34
1971 1,565 107 1983-2004 12-33
1972 1,656 100 1983-2004 11-32
1973 1,549 92 1983-2004 10-31
1974 2,539 154 1983-2004 9-30
1975 3,014 179 1983-2004 8-29
1976 3,961 238 1983-2004 7-28
1977 5,154 304 1983-2004 6-27
1978 5,129 290 1983-2004 5-26
1979 4,609 265 1983-2004 4-25
1980 4,011 250 1983-2004 3-24
1981 4,256 241 1983-2004 2-23
1982 4,107 252 1983-2004 1-22
1983 3,837 237 1984-2004 1-21
1984 4,095 255 1985-2004 1-20
1985 3,881 250 1986-2004 1-19
1986 3,276 208 1987-2004 1-18
1987 2,764 190 1988-2004 1-17
1988 2,972 215 1989-2004 1-16
1989 2,658 204 1990-2004 1-15
1990 2,929 238 1991-2004 1-14
1991 2,306 202 1992-2004 1-13
1992 2,183 201 1993-2004 1-12
1993 1,561 167 1994-2004 1-11
1994 1,246 149 1995-2004 1-10
1995 1,113 150 1996-2004 1-9
1996 1,001 139 1997-2004 1-8
1997 906 151 1998-2004 1-7
1998 730 131 1999-2004 1-6
1999 620 137 2000-2004 1-5
2000 509 138 2001-2004 1-4
2001 264 95 2002-2004 1-3
1945 to 1969 The number of observed physicians per cohort lies between 12 and 85, which is not
enough for relevant statistical inference at the vintage level2002-2003
Total 81,691 6,016 1983-2004 1-34
(1) Experience is defined as the year of observation –first year of activity
Table 1
1983 1993 2004
gender (proportion of female) 0.132
(0.338)
0.187
(0.389)
0.247
(0.431)
seniority 5.779
(3.322)
10.736
(5.956)
17.663
(7.968)
seniority (cohorts 1945-2003) 11.106
(9.429)
12.847
(7.905)
18.037
(8.507)
earnings (€ 2004) 90,144
(42,948)
97,145
(42,020)
119,598
(48,309)
earnings net of charges (€ 2004) - 44,160
(22,815)
62,064
(28,724)
Number of observations 2,458 3,761 4,496
Table 2
Notes: Working sample : French GPs, sector 1, period 1983-2004, 81691 observations, cohorts
1970-2001. Standard errors are in parentheses
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1972 1977 1985 1993 1999
1972 -  (DS2)  (DS1)  (DS1)  (DS1)
1977 - -  (DS1)  (DS1)  (DS1)
1985 - - - =  (DS1)
1993 - - - -  (DS1)
Table 3
Notes:
 (DSs): the column dominates the row for s order stochastic dominance (s=1 or 2);
 (DSs) : the row dominates the column for s order stochastic dominance (s=1 or 2);
=: the distributions are equal
1972 1977 1985 1993 1999
1972 -  (DS1)  (DS1)  (DS1) =
1977 - -  (DS1)  (DS1)  (DS1)
1985 - - -  (DS1)  (DS1)
1993 - - - -  (DS1)
Table 4
Notes:
 (DSs): the column dominates the row for s order stochastic dominance (s=1 or 2);
 (DSs) : the row dominates the column for s order stochastic dominance (s=1 or 2);
=: the distributions are equal
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Gender -0.34296 (***) 0.00413
Mep specialisation -0.06501 (***) 0.00695
Years between PhD and 1rst year of
practice
-0.02243 (***) 0.00070052
Part-time independent practice -0.05236 (***) 0.00452
Part-time Hospital Practice 0.00196 (NS) 0.00245
Suburban area 0.09029 (***) 0.00413
Urban sprawl 0.11207 (***) 0.00786
Rural area 0.14524 (***) 0.00437
GPs :population ratio -0.00245 (***) 0.00025279
Specialists :population ratio 0.0000041 (NS) 0.00008969
Regional effects (ref :Ile de
France)
Rhône-Alpes -0.11129 (***) 0.00777
Picardie 0.20911 (***) 0.01050
Auvergne -0.00499 (NS) 0.01264
PACA -0.07752 (***) 0.01059
Champagne-Ardenne 0.14595 (***) 0.01238
Midi-Pyrénées 0.02739 (***) 0.01074
Languedoc Roussillon 0.01314 (NS) 0.01285
Basse Normandie 0.06732 (***) 0.01244
Poitou Charente 0.06073 (***) 0.01186
Centre 0.04638 (***) 0.00994
Limousin 0.01725 (NS) 0.01498
Corse -0.23278 (***) 0.02435
Bourgogne 0.04663 (***) 0.01109
Bretagne -0.03938 (***) 0.00953
Aquitaine 0.05191 (***) 0.01035
Franche Comté -0.03352 (***) 0.01290
Haute Normandie 0.16552 (***) 0.01051
Pays de la Loire 0.07260 (***) 0.00918
Lorraine 0.09727 (***) 0.00970
Nord 0.21432 (***) 0.00929
Alsace 0.00907 (NS) 0.01023
R² 0.2755
Fisher 269.56
Sample Size 81,691
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; * Statistically significant at the 10% level;
NS Non significant
Table 5
Notes: Method : OLS under constraints (2) and (3). Estimated cohort, experience and time xed
e¤ects are given by graph 5 to 7 in the text
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